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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Shane Erick Crawford appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction 
and Commitment. Mr. Crawford was convicted of two counts of lewd conduct. He 
asserts that the district court committed reversible error when it improperly instructed 
the jury. During deliberations the jury asked if touching the breast area of the alleged 
victim constituted manual to genital contact. The district court failed to inform the jury 
that the breast area is not considered genitals and any touching of the breast area could 
not be considered for the lewd conduct charges. The district court's failure to properly 
answer the jury question interfered with Mr. Crawford's right to due process. 
Alternatively, Mr. Crawford asserts that the district court abused its discretion in 
sentencing him to excessive sentences without giving proper consideration to the 
mitigating factors in his case. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On May 25, 2010, an Indictment was filed charging Mr. Crawford with two counts 
of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and two counts of sexual abuse of a child 
under the age of sixteen years. (R., pp.11-13.) Mr. Crawford entered not guilty pleas to 
the four charges. (R., pp.16-17.) 
The State's first witness was As.C. 1 As.C. testified that she is Mr. Crawford's 
daughter and that in 2009 she was living in a home with him and the rest of her family. 
(Tr., p.196, L.1 - p.198, L.5.) A few months before July of 2009, As.C. and 
1 For purposes of this Appellant's Brief the victims will be identified as As.C. and An.C., 
rather than by there initials AC., to alleviate confusion. 
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Mr. Crawford were watching a movie while laying on the couch in the living room. 
(Tr., p.198, Ls.6 - p.199, L.19.) As.C. testified that while lying on the couch, 
Mr. Crawford "started reaching up my shirt and groping my breasts and then he started 
going down into my panties and began touching my vagina." (Tr., p.199, Ls.21 - 25.) 
As.C. elaborated that Mr. Crawford's hand was over her bra feeling her breasts and that 
"he was feeling down into my crotch area." (Tr., p.200, L.12 - p.201, L.7.) As.C. 
thought the entire event lasted about 30 minutes and when "he was going onto my 
vagina" she left to go play video games upstairs. (Tr., p.201, Ls.18-25.) 
The next witness was Tracy Crawford, Mr. Crawford's ex-wife. (Tr., p.218, L.7 -
p.219, L.3.) Ms. Crawford testified about the family relationships and the divorce, and 
was allowed to testify about both girls making disclosures to her regarding being 
sexually touched by Mr. Crawford. (Tr., p.218, L.12 - p.234, L.6.) 
An.C. was the next witness. An.C. testified that she is also Mr. Crawford's 
daughter. (Tr., p.238, Ls.8-16.) She claimed that when she was in 8th grade, 
Mr. Crawford offered her an alcoholic drink and asked her if she knew what a clit was. 
(Tr., p.242, Ls.10-18.) An.C. did not know, Mr. Crawford then said "let me show you," 
then "he went to show me" and she backed away. (Tr., p.243, Ls.7-12.) She stated that 
he touched her "outside of my vaginal area" going up her shorts. (Tr., p.243, Ls.13-19.) 
On another occasion, when An.C. was about 13 years old, she was on the couch with 
Mr. Crawford and he was rubbing her leg up towards her privates, outside of her bikini 
line. (Tr., p.244, L.20 - p.245, L.21.) Around Christmas of 2008, Mr. Crawford allegedly 
pulled out his penis and tried to show it to An.C. but she looked away. (Tr., p.248, L.24 
- p.251, L.11.) At a UFC party, Mr. Crawford allegedly grabbed An.C.'s breast in front 
of others in a joking way. (Tr., p.251, L.12 - p.253, L.11.) Another time, while on the 
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phone with her grandfather, Mr. Crawford began rubbing An.C.'s stomach and moving 
his hand toward her shirt; she kept batting it away before he could touch any private 
areas. (Tr., p.254, L.1 - p.257, L.2.) 
The State then presented the testimony of the detective assigned the case and a 
counselor specializing in counseling sexually abused children. (Tr., p.274, L.22 - p.335, 
L.7.) The State's last witness was Sharon Crawford, Mr. Crawford's mother, who noted 
that the girls had disclosed that Mr. Crawford had been touching them in a way that 
made them uncomfortable, but saw nothing sexual about the touching they reported. 
(Tr., p.346, Ls.1-16, p.351, L.22 -p.352, L.4.) The State rested. (Tr., p.388, Ls.15-16.) 
Mr. Crawford called his son, Nolan Crawford. (Tr., p.405, Ls.5-12.) Nolan 
testified that his father had a good relationship with his family, that he knew that An.C. 
had walked in on her father in states of undress in the bathroom and had walked in on 
her parents having sex. (Tr., p.407, L.8 - p.413, L.19, p.415, L.18 - p.416, L.4.) 
George Crawford testified similarly. (Tr., p.429, L.1 - p.435, L.18.) The defense then 
rested. (Tr., p.462, Ls.6-7.) 
The State then recalled An.C. who testified that she had walked in on her parents 
having sex in their bathroom. (Tr., p.465, L.3 - p.467, L.5.) The State then rested. 
(Tr., p.469, L.4.) 
The jury was instructed and excused to deliberate. (Tr., p.482, L.7 - p.492, L.7, 
p.534, L.12.) During deliberations, the jury sent a number of questions to the judge. 
(Tr., p.542, L.6 - p.546, L.2.) Question number three was: 
In order to have committed manual - genital contact does it require 
touching the vaginal area? 
Does touching of breast-area constitute manual-genital contact? 
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(Augmentation2: Jury Questions, Jury Question #3.) Defense counsel stated that the 
answer was "no." (Tr., p.544, L.21.) The district court stated that it was "not going to 
define for them manual-genital." (Tr., p.544, Ls.21-24.) The State asked that they jury 
just be informed that they needed to re-read the instructions. (Tr., p.545, Ls.6-7.) The 
district court noted: 
Well, if the jury - I do not feel comfortable defining, and, in fact, there is 
case law that says not only should you default to the standard instructions, 
but that while - while it may see - it's tempting to want to define every 
single word, that it's inappropriate for the court to do so and that the jurors 
have to apply their understanding - their common ordinary understanding 
to it. And, therefore, I'm just going to tell them to reread the instructions. 
(Tr., p.545, Ls.8-18.) The jury was then specifically informed, "Please re-read all the 
instructions." (Augmentation: Jury Questions, Answer to Jury Question No. 3.) 
Later, the jury returned guilty verdicts for both of the lewd conduct charges and 
not guilty verdicts for the sex abuse charges. (R., pp.121-124.) 
At sentencing, the State requested unified sentences of twenty-five years, with 
ten years fixed, concurrent on each count and concurrent with the other case. 
(Tr., p.589, Ls.21-25.) Defense counsel requested unified sentences of ten years, with 
three years fixed, concurrent and concurrent with the other case. (Tr., p.601, Ls.9-14.) 
The district court imposed unified sentences of twenty-five years, with six years fixed, 
for both counts, to run concurrently with each other and consecutive to Ada County 
Case Number CR-FE-2009-12074. (R., pp.164-167.) Mr. Crawford filed a Notice of 
Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of Conviction and Commitment. 
(R., pp.170-172.) 
2 A Motion to Augment was filed on Tuesday, December 6, 2011. As of the filing of this 
brief, the motion has not been ruled upon. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court deny Mr. Crawford's right to due process of law by incorrectly 
instructing the jury, by failing to clarify, in response to a jury question, that the breast 
area is not a "genital" for purposes of the lewd and lascivious conduct charges? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. Crawford, 
unified sentences of twenty-five years, with six years fixed, following his conviction 




The District Court Denied Mr. Crawford's Right To Due Process Of Law By Incorrectly 
Instructing The Jury, By Failing To Clarify, In Response To A Jury Question, That The 
Breast Area Is Not A "Genital" For Purposes Of The Lewd And Lascivious Conduct 
Charges 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Crawford asserts that the district court denied him his right to due process of 
law by incorrectly instructing the jury, by failing to clarify, in response to a jury question; 
that the breast area is not a "genital" for purposes of lewd and lascivious conduct 
charges. Because the statute defines the specific acts that constitute lewd conduct, and 
because touching the breast area is not an included act, the failure to clarify this allowed 
for the jury, that was clearly confused about what a "genital" was, to find Mr. Crawford 
guilty of lewd and lascivious conduct for having manual to breast area contact with 
As.C. and An.C. The law specifically disallows a conviction for lewd and lascivious 
conduct for this type of contact and as such, Mr. Crawford's due process rights were 
violated. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w]hether the trial court properly 
instructed the jury presents a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review. Upon review, this Court examines whether the instructions as a whole 'fairly 
and accurately reflect the applicable law.' An erroneous instruction provides a basis for 
reversal if the instruction misled the jury or otherwise prejudiced the complaining party." 
State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 239 (1999) (citing State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310, 
(1998)). 
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C. The District Court Denied Mr. Crawford's Right To Due Process Of Law By 
Incorrectly Instructing The Jury, By Failing To Clarify, In Response To A Jury 
Question, That The Breast Area Is Not A "Genital" For Purposes Of The Lewd 
And Lascivious Conduct Charges 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[n]o person 
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state 
shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Finally, the Idaho Constitution also guarantees that, "[n]o 
person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." lo. 
CONST. art. I, §13. 
In State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43 (Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
held, "[t]he requirement that the State prove every element of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt is grounded in the constitutional guarantee of Due Process." Id. at 47 
(citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 
(1970); State v. McDougall, 113 Idaho 900, 902 (Ct. App. 1988)). "A jury instruction that 
lightens the prosecution's burden of proof by omitting an element of the crime, creating 
a conclusive presumption as to an element, or shifting to the defendant the burden of 
persuasion on an essential element, is impermissible." Id. (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 
421 U.S. 684, 95 (1975); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); State v. 
Buckley, 131 Idaho 164 (1998); State v. Williams, 103 Idaho 635,639 (Ct. App. 1982)). 
1. The District Court's Failure To Inform The Jury That Manual To Genital 
Contact Does Not Include Touching The Breast Area Was Erroneous 
In the present case, the jurors asked: 
In order to have committed manual - genital contact does it require 
touching the vaginal area? Does touching of breast-area constitute 
manual-genital contact? 
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(Augmentation: Jury Questions, Jury Question #3.) Defense counsel stated that the 
answer was "no." (Tr., p.544, L.21.) The district court noted: 
Well, if the jury - I do not feel comfortable defining, and, in fact, there case 
law that says not only should you default to the standard instructions, but 
that while - while it may see - it's tempting to want to define every single 
word, that it's inappropriate for the court to do so and that the jurors have 
to apply their understanding - their common ordinary understanding to it. 
And, therefore, I'm just going to tell them to reread the instructions. 
(Tr., p.545, Ls.8-18.) The jury was then specifically informed, "Please re-read all the 
instructions." (Augmentation: Jury Questions, Answer to Jury Question No. 3.) 
The jury had been previously instructed: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Lewd and Lascivious 
Conduct, as charged in Count I of the Indictment, the state must prove 
each of the following: 
1. On or between April and June 2009 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant SHANE ERICK CRAWFORD committed an 
act of manual-genital contact upon or with the body of AC., 
4. AC. was a child under sixteen (16) years of age, and 
5. the defendant committed such act with the specific intent to 
arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust or passions or sexual desires of the 
defendant, of such child, or of some other person. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty. 
(R., p.140.) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Lewd and Lascivious 
Conduct, as charged in Count II of the Indictment, the state must prove 
each of the following: 
1. On or between 2007 and 2008 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant SHANE ERICK CRAWFORD committed an 
act of manual-genital contact upon or with the body of AC., 
4. A.G. was a child under sixteen (16) years of age, and 
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5. the defendant committed such act with the specific intent to 
arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust or passions or sexual desires of the 
defendant, of such child, or of some other person. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty. 
(R., p.141.) 
"A trial court has the duty to properly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the 
case before it." Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Gas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 313 
(2010). The instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the charging document 
as to the means by which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged. 
State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 147, (2007). If they do not, there can be a fatal 
variance between the jury instructions and the charging document. State v. Folk, 151 
Idaho 327, 342 (2011 ). Additionally, the jury instructions must not permit the defendant 
to be convicted of conduct tl1at does not constitute the type of crime charged. Id. In this 
case, Mr. Crawford was charged with lewd conduct by committing manual-genital 
contact upon As.C. and An.C. 
The crime of lewd conduct with a minor specifically includes several types of 
sexual contact, including genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital 
contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact, or manual-genital contact. I.C. § 18-
1508. In State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed 
whether touching or kissing the chest of a prepubescent girl constituted lewd conduct. 
The Court held that it did not because the type of conduct included in the phrase 
"including but not limited to" must be the conduct of a like or similar class or character to 
the types of conduct specifically listed. Id. at 486-87. 
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In the case at hand, the jury was clearly confused about whether or not the 
breast area was a "genital." Defense counsel's statement that the answer to the jury's 
question is "no," shows that counsel believed, correctly, that touching of the breast area 
could not constitute lewd conduct. The district court's answer in merely directing the 
jury back to the original instructions did not provide any guidance on the issue. The 
instructions did not include any definition of what a genital is or making any note that the 
breast area was not included in the definition of genitals. (R., pp.125-155.) 
Mr. Crawford does not assert that the district court had to define "genitals" for the jury, 
although it could have, but instead asserts that the district court was obligated to instruct 
the jury that touching of the breast area could not constitute lewd conduct. It was 
apparent from the question that the jury was potentially considering that breast area 
touching could constitute lewd conduct. This type of activity is not only different from 
what Mr. Crawford was originally charged, but is not conduct that constitutes the type of 
crime charged. The only type of conduct for which Mr. Crawford could lawfully have 
been convicted was manual-genital contact, even if the jury believed that he engaged in 
other touching with the intent to gratify his lust, passions, or sexual desires. Touching 
the breast area would not constitute the crime of lewd conduct. Thus, the failure to 
clarify that touching the breast area could not constitute lewd conduct permitted the jury 
to find Mr. Crawford guilty of conduct that does not constitute the crime for which he 
was charged. 
2. It Is Impossible To Discern Whether The Jury In This Case Reached Its 
Verdict On A Valid Or Invalid Legal Theory; Therefore, The Convictions 
Must Be Vacated And Case Remanded 
Mr. Crawford asserts that the error in the jury instructions constituted legal error 
and, therefore, the doctrine of l1armless error does not apply. Mr. Crawford asserts that 
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the proper standard to determine whether or not his conviction should be vacated is 
whether or not this Court can discern whether the jury reached its verdict on a valid or 
invalid legal theory. 
In Buckley, the State urged the Court to find the errors in the jury instructions to 
be harmless error. Buckley, 131 Idaho at 166. The Court rejected the State's theory 
and found: 
Because the error in Instruction No. 18 was a legal error, the doctrine of 
harmless error is not applicable. In State v. Townsend, this Court 
determined that in cases where it is not possible "to discern whether the 
jury based its verdict on a valid or invalid legal theory," the jury's verdict of 
conviction must be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. 
Id. at 166-167 (citing State v. Townsend, 124 Idaho 881, 887 (1993)). The Court found 
that it could not discern whether the jury reached its verdict based on the correct or 
incorrect legal theory and vacated the conviction. Id. at 167. 
Mr. Crawford asserts that it is impossible to discern in this case whether the jury 
reached its verdict based on a proper or improper theory. Both of the alleged victims 
presented testimony regarding both vaginal and breast area touching. As.C. testified 
that a few months before July of 2009, As.C. and Mr. Crawford were watching a movie 
while laying on the couch in the living room. (Tr., p.198, Ls.6 - p.199, L.19.) As.C. 
testified that while lying on the couch, Mr. Crawford "started reaching up my shirt and 
groping my breasts and then he started going down into my panties and began touching 
my vagina." (Tr., p.199, Ls.21 - 25.) As.C. elaborated that Mr. Crawford's hand was 
over her bra feeling her breasts and that "he was feeling down into my crotch area." 
(Tr., p.200, L.12 - p.201, L.7.) As.C. thought the entire thing lasted about 30 minutes 
and when "he was going onto my vagina" she left to go play video games upstairs. 
(Tr., p.201, Ls.18-25.) 
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An.C. testified that when she was in 8th grade Mr. Crawford offered her an 
alcoholic drink and asked her if she knew what a clit was. (Tr., p.242, Ls.10-18.) An.C. 
did not know, Mr. Crawford then said "let me show you," then "he went to show me" and 
she backed away. (Tr., p.243, Ls.7-12.) She stated that he touched her "outside of my 
vaginal area" going up her shorts. (Tr., p.243, Ls.13-19.) On another occasion, when 
An.C. was about 13 years old, she was on the couch with Mr. Crawford and he was 
rubbing her leg up towards her privates, outside of her bikini line. (Tr., p.244, L.20 -
p.245, L.21.) Around Christmas of 2008, Mr. Crawford allegedly pulled out his penis 
and tried to show it to An.C. but she looked away. (Tr., p.248, L.24 - p.251, L.11.) At a 
UFC party, Mr. Crawford allegedly grabbed An.C.'s breast in front of others in a joking 
way. (Tr., p.251, L.12 - p.253, L.11.) Another time, while on the phone with her 
grandfather, Mr. Crawford began rubbing An.C.'s stomach and moving his had toward 
her shirt; she kept batting it away before he could touch any private areas. (Tr., p.254, 
L.1 - p.257, L.2.) 
Further, there is evidence that the jury was confused about what conduct went 
with each charge. The jury asked the district court: 
Can you confirm that 
Charge 1 = [As.C.] on the couch incident 
Charge 2 - [An.C.] being asked about "clit" 
Charge 3 - Penis exposure to [An.C.] 
Charge 4 - [An.C.] on phone with grandfather+ touching her 
(Augmentation: Jury Questions, Jury Question Number 4.) The district court informed 
the jury, over objection, that "The alleged victim in Count I is [As.C.]. The alleged victim 
in Counts II-IV is [An.C.] The jury is to rely on its memory of the evidence." 
(Augmentation: Jury Questions, Answer to Jury Question Number 4.) 
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Because the jury heard testimony from both alleged victims that Mr. Crawford 
had touched their breast area and was confused about what conduct was alleged in 
each charge, it is impossible to discern whether or not the jury reached its verdict on a 
valid theory of law. As such, this Court should vacate Mr. Crawford's convictions. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Crawford, Unified 
Sentences Of Twenty-Five Years, With Six Years Fixed, Following His Convictions For 
Lewd Conduct 
Mr. Crawford asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentences of 
twenty-five years, with six years fixed, to run concurrent with each other, but 
consecutive with another unrelated case, are excessive. Where a defendant contends 
that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court 
will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of 
the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Crawford does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Mr. Crawford must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. ( citing State v. Broadhead, 120 
Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 
(1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection 
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
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rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978)). 
Mr. Crawford asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the 
mitigating factors that exist in his case. Specifically, he asserts that the district court 
failed to give proper consideration to his prior military service and honorable discharge. 
Military service coupled with an honorable discharge is a compelling circumstance that 
should be considered as a mitigating sentencing factor. State v Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 
(1982). 
Mr. Crawford served in the Army and was honorably discharged. (Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) Attachment, p.193.) He served for about five 
years. (PSI, p.10.) During his service, he received promotions and numerous 
certificates for training and achievement. (PSI Attachment, pp.200-207, 385-397.) He 
also received an Army Achievement Medal for his "exceptionally meritorious 
achievement during Roving Sands '95 as a PATRIOT Launcher Crew Member and NBC 
Special Team Member." (PSI Attachment, p.206.) He is also a disabled veteran, 
receiving 30% disability compensation due to a service-connected disability. (PSI 
Attachment, p.209.) 
Additionally, Mr. Crawford has a great deal of community support. In State v. 
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that family and 
friend support were factors that should be considered in the Court's decision as to what 
is an appropriate sentence. Id. Mr. Crawford supplied numerous letters of support to 
the district court. (PSI Attachment, pp.221-242, 400-416.) His children wrote about 
how he has been a positive role model and shown them love throughout their lives. 
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(PSI Attachment, pp.221-223, 236-237.) Michael Crawford, one of Mr. Crawford's sons, 
specifically wrote that: 
I couldn't imagine not having a dad like Shane Crawford, his is the 
epiphany [sic] of what a great father should be. I am 21 years old and 
even till this day we tell each other we love one another and we still hug 
and I still treat him with the upmost respect. He raised me to be a great 
man and he put his life on the line for my freedom, my fiancees [sic] 
freedom, and my unborn childes [sic] freedom. I love him to death and he 
has been an outstanding dad to me and my family. 
(PSI Attachment, p.236.) In a later letter, Michael stated that, "When I was young all my 
friends wanted to be just like superman or batman and I wanted to be just like my dad. 
He was and still is my hero." (PSI Attachment, p.403.) George Crawford also wrote a 
letter in support of his father, noting that: 
My dad has raised me not only to love the people I know but to 
treat them the way I would want to be treated, ever [since] Shane was my 
dad I always looked up to him I wish I could be half the man he was to me 
and his family. He was the one thing taught me how to be strong and how 
whatever I set my mind to I can and I will achieve it. He was the one to 
pick me up every time I fell. Shane would always put others before he 
would put himself, family came first to him and then god and then friends 
and then himself. My dad was a high school wrestler and won many 
matches but he also lost many matches and the one thing he told me is 
that it doesn't matter if you win or lose what matters is that you tried and 
you gave it your all and that's what he did for me and the family. 
I need him back and hope you can show mercy on a man who deserves it. 
I will help my dad with anything the court decides for him. I will drive him 
back and forth to classes. I will be able to get him a job and help him with 
whatever he needs help with. 
(PSI Attachment, pp.400-401.) Mr. Crawford's other son, Nolan, wrote that 
Mr. Crawford has been his hero and that, "I love him with all my heart and I wouldn't 
trade him for anything." (PSI Attachment, p.402.) 
His sister, Charlotte Crawford, noted that Mr. Crawford is "a kind, loving and 
caring person who would do anything for anyone" and also discussed his love of sports 
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and military career. (PSI Attachment, p.222.) Another sister, Jodi, noted that 
Mr. Crawford is loving, committed, and supportive. (PSI Attachment, pp.224-225.) His 
sister, Hedi, noted that Mr. Crawford "is a wonderful man and I am proud he is my 
brother." (PSI Attachment, p.232.) Family friends described Mr. Crawford as a "loving, 
honorable young man." (PSI Attachment, pp.223-224, 240, 414-416.) Leaders of his 
church recognize him as person of high integrity, with a positive outlook on life, friendly, 
and reliable. (PSI Attachment, pp.255, 233.) 
His co-workers also speak very highly of Mr. Crawford. (PSI Attachment, pp.226-
227, 234-235, 238-239, 241-242.) Michael Burns noted that not only was Mr. Crawford 
a skilled worked, but that "I see Shane as a very kind hearted person who has a sincere 
concern for others especially the downtrodden or troubled soul ... He's the kind of guy 
who [is] the first at your door should you need some help moving or emotional support. 
That is why I like him so much as a man and consider him a friend." (PSI Attachment, 
pp.226, 234.) 
Sharon Crawford, Mr. Crawford's mother, wrote a lengthy letter detailing the 
positive attributes of Mr. Crawford throughout his life; as a boy helping lost and hurt 
animals, playing sports, helping disadvantaged families, and winning the admiration and 
respect of fellow students and school staff; as an adult enlisting in the army, marrying a 
widow, adopting her children, raising them in a loving home, and working to support his 
family. (PSI Attachment, pp.229-230.) Mrs. Crawford informed the PSI Investigator 
that her son is "a terrific young man, who is caring, loving, and generous." (PSI, p.7.) 
Mr. Crawford also notes that while it was noted in the psychosexual evaluation 
that he had a moderate risk to reoffend and was not amenable for treatment because he 
refused to take responsibility for his actions, he maintains his innocence of the charges. 
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(PSI Attachment, pp319-320.) Mr. Crawford has submitted to polygraph examinations 
which showed no deception when he denied having sexual contact with the alleged 
victims. (PSI Attachment, pp.250-254, 381-384.) 
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Crawford asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences upon him. He asserts that 
had the district court properly considered his prior military service and friend and family 
support, it would have crafted less severe sentences. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Crawford respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction. 
Mr. Crawford contends that the court improperly instructed the jury allowing it to convict 
him on conduct that did not amount to lewd conduct. Alternately, he requests that this 
Court reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this ih day of December, 2011. 
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